Accepted Manuscript

Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games

Flavio Delbono, Luca Lambertini

PII: S0165-4896(17)30145-2

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.12.004

Reference: MATSOC 1989

To appear in: Mathematical Social Sciences

Received date: 17 March 2017 Revised date: 13 November 2017 Accepted date: 28 December 2017



Please cite this article as: Delbono F., Lambertini L., Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games. *Mathematical Social Sciences* (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.12.004

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

- We study a class of games featuring additively separable payoffs
- Best replies being orthogonal, Nash equilibria are in dominant strategies
- The requirement for collusive stability is independent of the number of players
- This is independent of the punishment used
- We outline examples from economic theory and international relations

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7372776

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/7372776

<u>Daneshyari.com</u>