Accepted Manuscript

Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games

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PII: S0165-4896(17)30145-2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.12.004
Reference: MATSOC 1989

To appear in: *Mathematical Social Sciences*

Received date : 17 March 2017
Revised date : 13 November 2017
Accepted date : 28 December 2017

Please cite this article as: Delbono F., Lambertini L., Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games. *Mathematical Social Sciences* (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.12.004

*Highlights (for review)

- We study a class of games featuring additively separable payoffs
- Best replies being orthogonal, Nash equilibria are in dominant strategies
- The requirement for collusive stability is independent of the number of players
- This is independent of the punishment used
- We outline examples from economic theory and international relations