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Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games

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- We study a class of games featuring additively separable payoffs
- Best replies being orthogonal, Nash equilibria are in dominant strategies
- The requirement for collusive stability is independent of the number of players
- This is independent of the punishment used
- We outline examples from economic theory and international relations

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