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Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers

Suchan Chae, Jaehee Song

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Highlights (for Review)

1. We study price competition between heterogeneous matchmakers in a two-sided matching market.
2. We show that when a passive matchmaker, who provides a random matching service, and an active matchmaker, who provides an assortive matching service, compete with entrance fees, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium.
3. We provide welfare comparison between a duopoly between a passive matchmaker and an active matchmaker and a monopoly operating both the passive and active networks.

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