




Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Physica A

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/physa

Q1 Cooperation in memory-based prisoner's dilemma game on interdependent networks

Q2 Luo Chao^{a,b,*}, Zhang Xiaolin^{a,b}, Liu Hong^{a,b}, Shao Rui^c

^a School of Information Science and Engineering, Shandong Normal University, Jinan 250014, China

^b Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory for Novel Distributed Computer Software Technology, Jinan 250014, China

^c The center of network optimization, Shandong Mobile Communication, Jinan 250024, China

HIGHLIGHTS

- The evolution of cooperation for memory-based players is based on interdependent lattices.
- Investigate the mutual influence of memory effect and interdependence.
- Find the optimal region of memory length and interdependence level for cooperation.
- Find the distinct roles of different kinds of players in the evolutionary game.

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 16 September 2015

Received in revised form 5 January 2016

Available online xxxxx

Keywords:

Evolutionary game

Prisoner's dilemma game

Interdependent networks

Memory effect

ABSTRACT

Memory or so-called experience normally plays the important role to guide the human behaviors in real world, that is essential for rational decisions made by individuals. Hence, when the evolutionary behaviors of players with bounded rationality are investigated, it is reasonable to make an assumption that players in system are with limited memory. Besides, in order to unravel the intricate variability of complex systems in real world and make a highly integrative understanding of their dynamics, in recent years, interdependent networks as a comprehensive network structure have obtained more attention in this community. In this article, the evolution of cooperation in memory-based prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on interdependent networks composed by two coupled square lattices is studied. Herein, all or part of players are endowed with finite memory ability, and we focus on the mutual influence of memory effect and interdependent network reciprocity on cooperation of spatial PDG. We show that the density of cooperation can be significantly promoted within an optimal region of memory length and interdependent strength. Furthermore, distinguished by whether having memory ability/external links or not, each kind of players on networks would have distinct evolutionary behaviors. Our work could be helpful to understand the emergence and maintenance of cooperation under the evolution of memory-based players on interdependent networks.

© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.

1. Introduction

In the context of Darwinian theory of evolution, altruistic behaviors in social group seem incomprehensible. However, Q3 2
altruism or cooperation, even if costly to the individuals, can be widely found in a realistic world, that coexists with other 3

* Corresponding author at: School of Information Science and Engineering, Shandong Normal University, Jinan 250014, China.
E-mail address: cluo79@gmail.com (L. Chao).

1 kinds of social behaviors such as competition, conflict and defection together to push forward the development of human
 2 society [1]. Hence, an understanding of cooperation among self-interest individuals is essential to reveal the evolution
 3 of social, economic and biological systems. During the past years, evolutionary game theory is applied to investigate
 4 the emergence and sustainability of cooperation in plenty of fields [2–4]. And, the prisoner's dilemma game, as one of
 5 well-known social dilemma games, is widely considered for investigating the collective behaviors among selfish individuals
 6 Q4 in repeated game [5–7].

7 Within the span of a decade, complex and nonlinear systems [8–13] as the research focus have been widely investi-
 8 gated. Thereinto, complex networks as powerful theoretical framework are used to describe and analyze realistic systems
 9 by means of abstract network models, such as epidemic spreading [14–18], dynamics of networks [19,20], communication
 10 defection [21–25], etc. Along with the deeper understanding of complex networks, interdependent networks instead of single,
 11 isolated groups have been received more attention in this research field [26]. Interdependent networks as a natural
 12 extension of the previous models are organized in two or more layers to depict the intricate variability of real complex sys-
 13 tems, normally seen as a multilevel system, where layers influencing each other in some way could have particular features
 14 as well as relatively independent dynamical process. In recent five years, there has been increasing attention in investi-
 15 gating diverse properties of interdependent networks, and abundant of results have been proposed, such as dynamics of
 16 system [27–29], identification of communities [30,31] and epidemic spreading [32–34], etc. Moreover, some applications
 17 based on the structure of interdependent networks, e.g. voting networks [35], ecological networks [36] and transport net-
 18 works [37] have also been proposed. Notably, evolutionary game based on interdependent networks, including the impact of
 19 biased utility on the evolution of cooperation [38], the spontaneous symmetry breaking of cooperation [39], different social
 20 dilemma implemented on integrative coupled networks [40], and optimal interdependence [41], etc., have been proposed.

21 In the traditional evolutionary game, players normally are assumed to be without memory, and strategies in the next
 22 round of game probabilistically depend on players' current fitness. However, as a matter of fact, when individuals make
 23 decisions, not only the current situation but also their previous experience should be involved. Some famous game strategies,
 24 such as tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy [42] and win-stay/lose-shift (WSLS) strategy [43], are both based on memory effect. Besides,
 25 in Ref. [44], the effect of memory on evolution of PDG in an isolated square lattice was discussed, where researchers
 26 found that the density of cooperators could be enhanced by memory effect in some scenarios; Horvath et al. [45] found
 27 that groups with limited memory could achieve higher level of cooperation than that with larger memory; in Ref. [46],
 28 memory effects were introduced into the PDG model under a noisy environment and the robustness of cooperation was
 29 evaluated; in Ref. [47], memory-based snowdrift game (MBSG) was presented and some non-monotonous phenomena were
 30 observed on both lattices and scale-free networks. According to the previous results, it can be concluded that the memory
 31 ability of players would be an important role to promote the level of cooperation in social dilemma. But, memory effect on
 32 evolutionary game can also be influenced by many factors, such as the length of memory, the temptation to defect and the
 33 structure of networks.

34 Based on the previous studies, in this article, we investigate memory effect on the evolution of cooperation in PDG game
 35 Q5 on interdependent networks. To address this problem, the memory-based PDG game is evolved on two coupled square
 36 lattices, where a certain fraction of randomly selected players have external links to the corresponding players in the other
 37 layer. To show the effect of memory and interdependence on the dynamical process of social dilemmas, two parameters
 38 are introduced. One is the memory length, M , of players, different from infinite memory [46], the accumulated fitness of
 39 individuals in the last M rounds is involved. The other parameter, ρ , is the fraction of players owning external links, which
 40 indicates the level of interdependence. We will show how the evolution of cooperation is promoted by the mutual influence
 41 of memory length of players and the level of interdependence between two layers. Then, to give insight into the evolution of
 42 social dilemma, we distinguish players in system into four different groups determined by whether having memory ability
 43 or external links. Consequently, for each kind of players, the evolutionary behaviors would be discussed. For further details
 44 with regard to the evolutionary games, update dynamics and population structure, we refer to Methods section.

45 This article is organized as follows. In Methods, the considered PDG model, the structure of interdependent networks
 46 and the description of simulation are given. Next, we present the main results and discuss their implications. Finally, a
 47 concluding remark is given.

48 2. Model

49 The evolutionary prisoner dilemma game is staged on two coupled square lattices of size $L \times L$, both of which are assumed
 50 to be 4-neighbor networks with periodic boundary conditions. A fraction, ρ , of players are selected at random to connect
 51 with the corresponding players residing on the other layer by external links. The parameter, ρ , determines the level of
 52 interdependence between two lattices. For easier reference, players owning external links are referred as “distinguished
 53 players”, and the rest which only have internal links to its four neighbors on the home network are called as “ordinary
 54 players”. To make comparative study with the previous works, the weak prisoner's dilemma game is adopted [48], where
 55 the reward for mutual cooperation $R = 1$, the temptation to defect $T = b$ ($1 < b < 2$), the punishment for mutual defection
 56 $P = 0$ and sucker's payoff $S = 0$.

57 Initially, each player located on the vertex of the lattices is designated as a cooperator or defector with equal probability.
 58 In interaction process t , player i plays the PDG game with its four nearest neighbors on its home network and obtains the
 59 accumulated payoff p_t^i . Meanwhile, when player i has an external link, the corresponding player i' on the other layer does the

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7378119>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/7378119>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)