Accepted Manuscript

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PII: \$1090-9443(16)30306-4 DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2017.01.001

Reference: YREEC 706

To appear in: Research in Economics

Received date: 21 December 2016 Revised date: 18 January 2017 Accepted date: 20 January 2017



Please cite this article as: Susan Athey, Jonathan Levin, The Value of Information in Monotone Decision Problems, *Research in Economics* (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.rie.2017.01.001

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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

The Value of Information

in Monotone Decision Problems*

Susan Athey and Jonathan Levin †

January 2017

Abstract

We study the information preferences and information demand of decision-makers facing uncertainty. We focus on monotone decision problems in which the posterior beliefs induced by the decision-maker's information can be ordered so that higher actions are chosen in response to higher signal realizations. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for decision makers with different classes of payoff functions to prefer one information structure to another. We also provide conditions under which two decision-makers in a given class can be ranked in terms of their information demand. Applications and examples are given.

JEL Classification: C44, C60, D81.

Keywords: Bayesian decision problems, uncertainty, value of information, stochastic dominance, stochastic orderings.

^{*}The first version of this paper appeared as an MIT working paper in 1998. We thank Federico Etro for nudging us toward publication. We have benefited from comments by Scott Ashworth, Kyle Bagwell, Dirk Bergemann, Glenn Ellison, John Geanakoplos, Bengt Holmström, Eric Lehmann, Richard Levin, Meg Meyer, Paul Milgrom, Stavros Panageas, Ben Polak, and Lones Smith. Some of the work on this paper was done while we were visitors at the Cowles Foundation at Yale University. Athey thanks the NSF for financial support.

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