Research report

Can clients of economically dependent auditors benefit from voluntary audit firm rotation? An experiment with lenders

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ABSTRACT

This study utilizes a nationwide random selection of 111 lenders in a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment to determine whether the level of an auditor’s economic dependence on a client and type of auditor rotation affects lenders’ independence and reliability perceptions and decisions to lend money to a potential borrower. Previous literature shows that financial statement users use client importance as a measure of audit quality when revenue streams are not equal across clients. This can negatively affect perceptions of independence and financial statement reliability. As United States regulators look for ways to improve audit quality under the current partner rotation mandate, this study explores whether an audited entity that voluntarily adopts a policy of firm rotation can mitigate the negative effects of the auditor’s dependence on the client. Findings suggest that lenders view clients of economically dependent auditors (CEDA) as less independent from its auditor and perceive its financials as less reliable than clients without a dependent auditor (non-CEDA). Lenders are less likely to grant a loan to CEDA. However, under firm rotation, there is not only an increase in lenders’ perceptions of reliability of CEDA financials, but also no difference in perceptions of reliability of CEDA and non-CEDA financials.

1. Introduction

Bank loans are the primary source of external loans for corporations, and lenders make loan decisions based on an information framework consisting of financial and non-financial information. When deciding to extend a loan, lenders’ knowledge that the loan requestor is economically important to its auditor may become relevant information for this framework. Lenders may perceive that the requestor is not independent of its auditor, which may negatively impact financial statement reliability perceptions and may lead the lender to deny the loan request. In addition, it is common for local offices of even large audit firms to take on economically important clients, possibly leading the audit firm to depend on continuous receipt of fees from that client. This may negatively affect perceptions of audit quality (Barlett, 1993; Beattie, Brandt, & Fearnley, 1999; DeAngelo, 1981; Firth, 1980; Gil, 1991; Lowe & Pany, 1995; Pany & Reckers, 1980; Teoh & Lim, 1996; Wallman, 1996). Clients of economically dependent auditors (CEDA) that are seeking loans may benefit from implementing procedures to improve lenders’ independence perceptions.

This research explores the effects of client importance on lenders’ perceptions of independence, financial statement reliability, and decisions to grant a loan. In addition, this research suggests a voluntary audit firm rotation policy for CEDA as a method of mitigating possible negative effects of its auditor’s economic dependence, thereby closely replicating and extending the works of Schneider (2010) and (2011) and Daniels and Booker (2011).

2. Background, literature review, and hypotheses

2.1. The economic theory of auditor independence and economic dependence

According to the economic theory of auditor independence, an auditor may have incentives to compromise its independence for a client that represents a high proportion of quasi-rents (the percentage of the total revenue stream attributable to one client, the basis for CEDA in this study), or a continuous revenue stream (DeAngelo, 1981; Reynolds & Francis, 2001). Past PCAOB Chairman James Doty expressed concern about a seemingly inherent desire of an auditor to maintain a client and the struggles that desire may present over time (Doty, 2012). Stakeholders, who usually use auditor size to represent a measure of audit quality, use client importance as an alternative measure of audit quality when revenue streams are not identical across clients (DeAngelo, 1981). When this occurs, perceptions of CEDA financial statement reliability may suffer amid doubt that its auditor can withstand client...
management pressure during an auditor/client conflict (Gul, 1991; Mautz & Sharaf, 1961). This phenomenon occurs at the decision-making local office level of a firm, which is responsible for contracting with clients, administering audits, and issuing audit reports (Wallman, 1996).

Some studies find no effect of client importance on auditor independence, audit quality, or reporting, which supports the notion of reputation protection (Chung & Kallapur, 2003; Craswell, Stokes, & Laughton, 2002; Gaver & Paterson, 2007; Hunt & Luselged, 2007; Kerler & Brandon, 2010; Li, 2010; Pany & Reckers, 1980; Reynolds & Francis, 2001; Schneider, 2010). However, others indicate that local office-level auditors who are economically dependent on their clients are subject to greater management influence than those who are not dependent, and may even report more favorably on their local clients’ financials (Ahmed, Duellman, & Abdel-Meguid, 2006; Bartlett, 1993; Beattie et al., 1999; Brandon & Mueller, 2006; Chan, Lin, & Mo, 2006; Chi, Douthett, & Lisc, 2012; Firth, 1980; Gul, 1991; Hoitash, Markelevich, & Barragato, 2007; Khurana & Ram, 2006; Lowe & Pan, 1995; Teoh & Lim, 1996). Using investors, Schneider (2011) finds that knowledge of an auditor’s revenue dependence on a client negatively affects investment decisions. This study presents the following hypotheses based on the economic theory of auditor independence:

H1a: Lenders perceive the auditor of CEDA to be less independent than a non-CEDA auditor.
H1b: Lenders perceive the financial statements of CEDA to be less reliable than those of a client with a non-CEDA auditor.
H1c: Lenders are less likely to approve the loan request of CEDA than that of a client with a non-CEDA auditor.

2.2. Rotation and economic dependence interaction

In the U.S., audit partner rotation after the completion of every fifth year is the primary means for auditors to maintain independence (U.S. House of Representatives 2002, also known as Sarbanes Oxley, Section 203). Even so, SOX 2002 also urged examination of firm rotation as a means of increasing independence. PCAOB Concept Release 2011–2006 cites continuing audit failures despite the partner rotation mandate (PCAOB 2011). Though the causes of audit failure are complex, the Concept Release asserts that firm rotation alleviates at least one component of audit failure, which is lack of independence stemming from long auditor tenure.

Some experimental studies find that firm rotation leads to better perceptions of independence, audit quality, reliability, ability to withstand management conflict with the auditor, and even lower audit firm liability (Arel, Brody, & Pan, 2006; Bowlin, Hobson, & Piercey, 2015; Daniels & Booker, 2011; Dopuch, King, & Schwartz, 2001; Gates, Love, & Reckers, 2007; Jennings, Pan, & Reckers, 2006; Wang & Tuttle, 2009). Daniels and Booker (2011), which the current study extends by adding a client importance measure, find that bank loan officers perceive an audit firm that rotates as more independent than a firm that does not rotate. Finally, Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) find no significant difference in the amount of an overstatement believed to be recorded by the client or perceived auditor independence under firm rotation and partner rotation conditions. Whereas Kaplan and Mauldin (2008) use student participants, the current study utilizes lenders, who may have differing perceptions about independence and reliability and may make different decisions than users with little experience. This study posits that firm rotation also produces the best perceptions of CEDAs’ auditor independence and financial statement reliability, and it presents the following hypotheses:

H2a: Firm rotation improves perceptions of independence of CEDA audit firms.
H2b: Firm rotation improves perceptions of CEDA financial statement reliability.
H2c: Lenders are more likely to grant a loan to CEDA under firm rotation than partner rotation.

3. Research design

3.1. Participants

The sample comprises 1200 commercial lenders in the U.S., randomly selected from the Hugo Dunhill Company database of 12,000 loan officers. Lenders are randomly assigned to one of four treatments. Responses, excluding those who failed the manipulation check, total 111 for a response rate of 9.47%. Respondents have an average of 24.10 years of experience granting loans, 28.77 years of banking experience, and devote 63.27% of their job to loans. Approximately 90% of respondents work at banks with assets less than $10 billion, with the biggest concentration (51.4%) of respondents working at banks with assets of more than $100 million but less than one billion dollars, indicating that most respondents have experience handling the assets of small- to medium-sized banks. Over 87% (87.3%) of lenders are the President, Vice President, or CEO of the bank, and 96.4% of respondents have a bachelor’s degree or higher.

3.2. Task and dependent variables

Loan officers receive the case reading, which closely mimics Schneider and Church (2008). Dolphin’s audited financials for the year ended June 30, 2012 are also presented. Dolphin Book Sellers wishes to obtain a $5,000,000 loan from a bank. The case presents, along with other background information, Dolphin’s rotation policy (partner or firm) and the level of its auditor’s economic dependence (2% or 60%, CEDA, of audit revenues received from all clients). Subjects are given five questions about the case and told to assume that there are no loan size or fund availability restrictions. Lenders sealed their completed questions in an envelope and proceeded to the manipulation check and demographics, which were also sealed and returned to the author. The five questions measure the dependent variables of lenders’ perceptions of independence, perceptions of financial statement reliability (for both unintentional and intentional mistakes and omissions), and loan decision (approve/reject and probability of extending the loan).

4. Results and implications

According to Table 1, there is a statistically significant difference between perceptions of independence (H1a) for subjects

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1 Audit failure occurs when auditors do not approach the audit with required independence, objectivity, and/or professional skepticism, and the opinion given on the financial statements cannot be supported.

2 The university's Institutional Review Board approved the use of human participants in this study.
