



Influenza A(H5N1) viruses with A(H9N2) single gene (matrix or PB1) reassortment isolated from Cambodian live bird markets

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ABSTRACT

Live bird market surveillance for avian influenza viruses in Cambodia in 2015 has led to the detection of two 7:1 reassortant influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1c viruses. These reassortant strains, designated A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015 and A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015, both contained a single gene (PB1 and matrix gene, respectively) from concurrently circulating A(H9N2) influenza viruses. All other viral genes from both isolates clustered with A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 viruses. Continued and prolonged co-circulation of influenza A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) viruses in Cambodian live bird markets may present a risk for the emergence of novel influenza reassortant viruses with negative agricultural and/or public health implications.

1. Introduction

Live bird markets (LBMs) in Asia are a critical factor in the persistence of avian influenza viruses in the region and the probable source of many reassortant viruses (Horwood et al., 2018). The presence of multiple avian species, insufficient biosecurity measures and constant introduction of immunologically naïve animals all contribute to the heightened risk for the emergence of influenza viruses with pandemic potential. While influenza hemagglutinin subtypes A(H5) and A(H7) are classically considered to have high pandemic potential, several other influenza subtypes including A(H6N1), A(H10N8) and A(H9N2) have crossed the species barrier into humans (Burke and Trock, 2018); and many other avian influenza viruses currently circulate in Asian poultry populations with the potential for adverse animal or human health impacts.

In Cambodia, AIV surveillance in poultry focuses on passive detection of AIVs in reportedly ill animals and active surveillance at LBMs. Cambodian LBMs predominantly sell live chickens and ducks to

consumers supplied from backyard flocks. Surveillance for AIVs at the rural farming level is not currently performed. Biosecurity measures at farms and LBMs are either minimal or non-existent. For instance, species separation during the rearing and trading process is not typical and vaccination of poultry against AIVs is illegal. At LBMs overnight bans on holding poultry are in place and veterinary officers that are in charge of each LBM ensure visibly ill poultry are not being traded. Previous studies have shown high levels of AIV prevalence, diversity and AIV subtype co-infections in Cambodian LBMs (Horwood et al., 2018; Horm et al., 2013, 2016). In this report we characterize two reassortant A(H5N1) viruses detected during AIV surveillance performed at LBMs in 2015.

2. Materials and methods

Active surveillance at Cambodian LBMs in 2015 was coordinated by the Institute Pasteur in Cambodia (IPC, WHO National Influenza Centre and H5 Reference Laboratory) and the National Animal Health and

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Production Research Institute (NAHPRI, from General Directorate for Animal Health and Production, Cambodian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). The sample collection strategy has been described previously (Horwood et al., 2018). Briefly, environmental and poultry samples were collected weekly from LBMs in Phnom Penh (the capital city of Cambodia) and surrounding areas. Pooled oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were collected from individual chickens and ducks, randomly selected from each LBM.

Samples were processed according to previously established methods and screened for the presence of influenza A viruses by real-time RT-PCR detection of the matrix protein (MP) gene (Horwood et al., 2018; Horm et al., 2013, 2016). Samples that were positive for influenza A virus were further tested for A(H5N1) and other avian influenza viruses of concern (namely H7 and H9) using real-time RT-PCR to detect H5 (primer sets H5a and H5b), N1, H7, and H9 genes. All assays were sourced from the International Reagent Resource (<https://www.internationalreagentresource.org/Home.aspx>).

To better understand the circulating subtypes in Cambodia, IPC routinely generates full genome avian influenza virus sequences from virus isolates cultured in embryonated eggs, using previously described methods (Horm et al., 2016; Rith et al., 2014). Briefly, full genome sequences were obtained using the Ion Torrent™ Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) platform at the WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza in Melbourne, Australia. Quality control and assembly of NGS data was performed using CLC Genomics Workbench (version 10). Any gaps in NGS sequences were filled using Sanger sequencing. Segment specific primers were used to amplify products that were then sequenced directly with BigDye Terminator v3.1 chemistry using a Genetic Analyzer 3500xL sequencing machine (Life Technologies). Phylogenetic trees were constructed using the maximum likelihood method based on the general time-reversible model with gamma distribution in RAxML (Stamatakis, 2014). Bootstrap values were calculated and expressed as a percentage from 1000 replicates. The GenBank accession numbers for Cambodian strains included in the phylogenetic analysis are: MH285274 – MH285329.

3. Results and discussion

During the course of isolation and sequencing, we detected two clade 2.3.2.1 influenza A(H5N1) 7:1 reassortant viruses from Cambodian LBM surveillance activities in 2015 that contained single genes from A(H9N2) viruses (Horwood et al., 2018). These viruses, designated A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015 and A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015, were originally detected by H5 RT-qPCR from swab material and were subsequently isolated in embryonated chicken eggs. Sequence analysis of the resulting isolates revealed that the viruses arose from two separate reassortment events. The first virus (A/duck/Cambodia/Z564W35M1/2015) was isolated from a duck sample collected in August 2015 and obtained its PB1 gene from A(H9N2). The second virus (A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015) was isolated from a chicken sample collected in November 2015 and contained a MP gene from an A(H9N2) virus. All other genes from both reassortant viruses originated from influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 (Fig. 1/Supplementary Fig. 1). Coinfection between A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) in the egg isolates and original samples was ruled out by confirming the absence of an H9 HA gene via PCR analysis.

The replacement of the A(H5N1) MP gene with that from A(H9N2) in strain A/chicken/Cambodia/Z850W49M1/2015 resulted in the acquisition adamantane drug resistance due to the presence of the M2 amino acid substitution S31N. Homotypic A(H5N1) clade 2.3.2.1 viruses are generally susceptible to adamantanes as they do not carry any of the genetic markers of adamantane resistance. Out of 808 A(H5) clade 2.3.2.1 viruses (including subclades 2.3.2.1a–2.3.2.1c) found on the Influenza Research Database (<https://www.fludb.org>), only 5% contained the S31N M2 mutation (Squires et al., 2012).

Influenza A(H9N2) is a low pathogenic avian influenza virus that

has become widespread throughout Asia and Africa since its first appearance in Southern China in 1994. Often co-circulating with other subtypes of concern, the A(H9N2) subtype has been detected in humans and pigs, so is considered a pandemic threat (Burke and Tock, 2018). In addition, A(H9N2) viruses appear to be extremely promiscuous and can easily reassort with other influenza viruses, often producing novel strains with increased ability to jump the species gap. Prior to the emergence of A(H7N9) in China, endemic chicken A(H9N2) viruses provided all of the internal genes through numerous reassortment events (Pu et al., 2015). Indeed, due to the ongoing co-circulation of these viruses, further reassortments between A(H7N9) and A(H9N2) are frequently reported (Cui et al., 2014). Additionally, influenza A(H9N2) contributed all of the internal genes to an A(H10N8) virus that caused a fatal infection in China in 2013 (Chen et al., 2014).

Interestingly, despite widespread, sustained co-circulation and frequent coinfection of influenza A(H5Nx) and A(H9N2), natural reassortants between these viruses are seldom detected (Table 1). Similar to the viruses described here from Cambodia, other reassortant viruses with an A(H5N1) backbone and single gene reassortment (7:1) with an A(H9N2) MP or PB1 gene have previously been identified in Bangladesh (Marinova-Petkova et al., 2014; Monne et al., 2013; Gerloff et al., 2014). There are also reports of A(H5N1) viruses with PB2 genes from A(H9N2) from Africa, India and the United Arab Emirates (Tosh et al., 2016; Naguib et al., 2015; Tassoni et al., 2016). Further, reassortant viruses with an A(H9N2) backbone and single gene reassortment with A(H5N1) have been described, including: viruses in Pakistan with an A(H5N1) NS gene; viruses in Southern China with an A(H5N1) PB1 gene; and viruses in Eastern China with an A(H5N1) HA gene (Iqbal et al., 2009; Dong et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2012a).

There are even fewer reports of multiple gene segment A(H5N1)/A(H9N2) reassortant viruses. Phylogenetic studies have revealed that influenza A(H9N2) may have provided the internal genes prior to the emergence of A(H5N1) in Hong Kong, 1997 (Guan et al., 1999). More recently, A(H5N2) viruses were detected in chickens from Tibet and Vietnam with half of the gene fragments originating from A(H5N1) and the other genes from A(H9N2) (Zhao et al., 2012b; Nishi et al., 2014). There was also a report of an A(H5N2) virus from China where all viral genes aside from HA and M clustered with A(H9N2) (Xu et al., 2015). Evidence of human infection with these reassortant viruses is extremely rare but they have been detected previously. In 2013, a Canadian resident died following a respiratory illness with meningoencephalitis after recently returning from China. The cause of the illness was confirmed to be influenza a clade 2.3.2.1c A(H5N1) 7:1 reassortant virus with an A(H9N2) PB2 gene (Pabbaraju et al., 2014).

Through active and passive surveillance systems, IPC and NAHPRI have documented high levels of avian influenza circulation in Cambodian LBMs, with co-circulation of multiple viral subtypes (Horwood et al., 2018; Horm et al., 2013, 2016). During the 2015 LBM study 45% (342/752) of the poultry samples collected were influenza A positive. High rates of A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) coinfections were also detected in poultry, with both viruses identified in 4.5% of chickens and 0.8% of ducks (Horwood et al., 2018). There is also evidence of sub-clinical human infections with these viruses in Cambodian LBMs, with antibodies to A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) detected in 4.5% and 1.8% of poultry workers, respectively (Horm et al., 2016). High co-circulation of a variety of avian influenza viruses is a risk for the emergence of novel reassortant influenza viruses, as was exemplified by a novel A(H5N1) clade 1.1.2 virus reassortant that emerged in poultry in Cambodia and Vietnam in 2013–2014. This virus contained the HA/NA genes from a clade 1.1.2 genotype Z virus and the internal and matrix genes from a clade 2.3.2.1a virus (Rith et al., 2014; Thor et al., 2015). This novel reassortant caused outbreaks in poultry as well as several human cases in both countries. In Cambodia the emergence of this virus was associated with a dramatic increase in human cases during 2013 and early 2014 (Ly et al., 2017).

Little is known about the impact of single A(H9N2) gene (7:1)

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