Accepted Manuscript

Revenue-sharing clubs provide economic insurance and incentives for sustainability in common-pool resource systems

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PII: S0022-5193(18)30295-9 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.06.003

Reference: YJTBI 9498

To appear in: Journal of Theoretical Biology

Received date: 4 February 2018 Revised date: 18 May 2018 Accepted date: 4 June 2018



Please cite this article as: Andrew R. Tilman, Simon Levin, James R. Watson, Revenue-sharing clubs provide economic insurance and incentives for sustainability in common-pool resource systems, *Journal of Theoretical Biology* (2018), doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.06.003

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Highlights

- Revenue-sharing clubs can emerge among common-pool resource harvesters
- Revenue-sharing clubs provide insurance to harvesters and improve management
- Clubs can be stable if the insurance benefit is more than the incentive to over-harvest
- These clubs may be a pathway to self-governance in volatile natural resource systems

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