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The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor

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Highlights

- Players in different roles cooperate together in the division of labor.
- We focus on linear division of labor to achieve goals.
- Monitoring violators is not effective in some social situations.
- The replicator equations for asymmetric games are used for analysis.
- Sanction systems without monitoring promote cooperation more than those with monitoring.

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