



Personal values and intergroup outcomes of concern for group honor[☆]



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ABSTRACT

Using random samples of approximately 200 Lebanese and 200 Syrian citizens, we examined the antecedents and consequences of individuals' desires to maintain the honor of different groups to which they belong. As expected, the importance of group honor was positively associated with the conservation values of conformity and tradition, negatively associated with the openness to change values of hedonism and stimulation, and positively related to the self-transcendence values of benevolence and universalism. Group honor concern was positively related to conforming and tender-minded personality traits and empathy. The intergroup outcomes of concern for group honor in Lebanon and Syria were examined in the context of relations between Arabs and Americans. Beyond the related effects of RWA and SDO, Lebanese and Syrians' concerns about maintaining the honor of their ingroups predicted support for violence against Americans through perceptions that Americans disrespect, mistreat, and want to humiliate Arabs. Similar patterns of relationships emerged in both Lebanon and Syria, bolstering confidence in the generalizability of the findings across cultures of honor with similar intergroup power dynamics. Implications for understanding the meaning of group honor across cultures with different intergroup power dynamics are discussed.

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Cultures of honor are organized around the notion that the value of a person is determined not only by estimations of one's own self-worth, but also by claims of honor for oneself that are acknowledged by others (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Pitt-Rivers, 1965; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). Honor is maintained through a reputation for toughness and willingness for retribution should honor not be duly paid (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Early work on cultures of honor attributed greater levels of violence in such cultures to cultural norms justifying the use of violence for self-protection and defense of honor (e.g., Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; see also Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom, 2008). Theorizing centered on the role of collective representations in honor cultures emphasizing the importance of vigilance to insults to one's personal honor and interpersonal violence (specifically among males) to maintain one's honor in the face of such insults.

Although early work on the topic focused on cross-cultural differences in the importance of personal honor and honor-related violence, recent work explores *individual differences* in the extent to which people

are concerned about honor and in their reactions to threats to honor. For example, mean levels of concern for family honor and negative emotional reactions to family honor violations are greater in Spain (an honor culture) than in The Netherlands (a non-honor culture), but there are also meaningful individual differences within the two cultures (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002b). Importantly, individual differences in concern for family honor predict the intensity of negative emotional reactions to threats to family honor. In the current study, we explore not only reactions to threats to group honor, but also antecedents of individual differences in desires to maintain group honor.

We focus on individuals' desires to maintain the honor of different groups to which they belong (e.g., family, nation), rather than their personal honor. Past research has examined personal values as predictors of concern for *personal* honor. We extend this previous work on values to examine relationships with *group* honor. Personal values represent people's basic motivational goals, or the guiding principles in their lives (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Maio, 2010; Rohan, 2000; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Helkama et al. (2013) found that in individualistic cultures such as Finland, personal honor was more important to people with stronger self-enhancement values, but in collectivistic cultures such as Russia, personal honor was more important to those with stronger self-transcendence and conservation values (see also Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a). Clearly, *personal* honor has different meanings across different cultures.

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In the current study, we ask whether the same is true for *group* honor. Consistent with the notion that social identities are extensions of self-definition (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), we apply the definition of personal honor to the group. Like personal honor, we conceive of group honor as a function of both internal and external factors. Group members must both claim honor on behalf of the group and be paid honor by others in order for the group to have honor. We examine the importance of group honor as an individual difference variable operating within two cultures of honor, Syria and Lebanon (see Wikan, 1984; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a, for discussions of honor in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean cultures; see also Guerra, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2013). We test two main hypotheses, one regarding antecedents and one regarding a potential consequence of concern for group honor. Regarding antecedents, we examine the degree to which individuals' personal values, personality traits, and dispositional empathy predict individual differences in concern for group honor. Regarding consequences, we explore the extent to which concern for group honor predicts support for violence against Americans as one way to defend ingroup honor against perceived attempts by Americans to disrespect, mistreat, and humiliate Arabs. As the two Arab countries are engaged in similar adversarial relations with the United States, we expect to find the same set of relationships in both countries; replication of findings across the two cultures will bolster confidence in the results.

1. Antecedents of concern for group honor: personal values

In examining the processes that link personal values to group honor concerns, we draw on Schwartz's theory of values (1992), which aspires to comprehensively represent the motivational goals that underlie individuals' basic values across cultures. The theory has been tested and verified in extensive cross-cultural research (Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005; Spini, 2003; see also Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009). Understanding which personal values predict group honor concerns may reveal which motivational goals are potentially fulfilled by group honor and therefore why some people care so much about it.

Schwartz (1992) identified 10 motivationally distinct types of values that reflect two basic conflicts. One universal human conflict pits values that emphasize conservation (tradition, conformity, security) against those that emphasize openness to change (stimulation, self-direction, hedonism). Conservation values express the motivation to avoid uncertainty, ambiguity, and instability. Openness to change values reflect opposing desires for independence and new experiences. The second universal human conflict pits values that emphasize self-enhancement (power, achievement; hedonism shares elements of both self-enhancement and openness to change) against those that emphasize transcending personal interests and promoting the welfare of others (universalism, benevolence). Self-enhancement values reflect desires for personal success, social prestige, and control over others. Self-transcendence values express the opposing motivation to serve the interests of others and seek social justice and equality for all people.

These 10 motivationally distinct types of values structurally relate to one another in a circular pattern. Adjacent values in the circle (e.g., tradition, conformity) share motivational goals; opposing values (e.g., tradition, hedonism) have conflicting goals. Due to the compatibilities of motivational goals underlying adjacent values and conflicts between motivational goals underlying opposing values, the 10 values form an integrated circumplex model with a predictable sinusoid pattern of correlations with external variables. Associations between the 10 value types and an external variable are strongest when the motivational goal underlying a particular value type matches the motivational goal of the external variable, and the associations decrease monotonically as one moves from this point in both directions around the circular structure of values (Schwartz, 1992). As such, it is possible to identify the motivational goal of an external variable such

as group honor concern by examining its associations with the 10 value types (e.g., Calogero, Bardi, & Sutton, 2009; Roccas, Schwartz, & Amit, 2010). The stronger the correlation between group honor concern and one of the value types, the more the motivational goal underlying group honor concern matches the motivational goal of the value as it has been identified in the Schwartz model.

1.1. Conservation and openness to change values

People concerned with the honor of the different groups to which they belong endeavor to maintain the value or esteem of their ingroups in the eyes of others. Groups have norms and traditions that convey the value of the ingroup. The esteem of one's group is maintained when group norms and traditions are upheld and is threatened when they are violated. Concern for group honor implies deference and deep respect for the symbols and traditions of one's ingroups. People who are concerned about the honor of their ingroups are attentive to ingroup norms, wish to abide by these norms, and believe that all group members should adhere to them, because non-normative behavior might lead to dishonor. Thus, concern for group honor is likely to be the most compatible with the importance of *tradition* and *conformity* values.

Concern for group honor is likely to conflict the most with the importance of *hedonism* and *stimulation* values. These values express the motivation for personal enjoyment and stimulating experiences. People who pursue stimulation and hedonism might act in ways that put the honor of the group at risk, and so the value placed upon them may directly contradict the value placed upon group honor.

1.2. Self-transcendence values

The core goal of *benevolence* values is to preserve and enhance the welfare of close others, such as members of one's ingroups. People who attribute high importance to benevolence values want to be helpful, responsible, and loyal. Therefore, people high on benevolence values are likely to be attentive to information that is relevant to the welfare of their ingroups, such as threats to the groups' honor, and are likely to wish to protect their ingroup members from such threats. In cultures of honor, in which upholding group honor is the prescribed norm and group members are viewed as having a moral obligation to respond to threats to group honor in order to protect the ingroup, we would expect that the more people attribute importance to benevolence values, the more they will be concerned about group honor.

Universalism values are intended to target concern for all of humankind. However, in some societies, individuals are socialized to apply their moral principles more exclusively to protect the welfare of ingroup members rather than all people. In such societies, which tend to be low in democratization like Lebanon and Syria, the meaning of universalism values falls closer to that of benevolence values in targeting concern for ingroup others (Schwartz, 2007). When universalism and benevolence values are both concerned with the welfare of the same target – ingroup members – they should be strongly positively related to each other and the positive relationship of group honor concern with benevolence should be mirrored in a similarly positive relationship with universalism values.

In sum, in Lebanon and Syria we expect that concern for group honor will be most positively correlated with the conservation values of *tradition* and *conformity*. (The third conservation value of *security* is less relevant to the importance of upholding group norms and traditions and so should not be as strongly positively related to group honor concern.) The importance of maintaining group honor should also be strongly positively correlated with the self-transcendence values of *benevolence* and *universalism*. It should be most negatively correlated with the openness to change values of *stimulation* and *hedonism*. (The third openness to change value of *self-direction* is less relevant to group honor concern and so should not be as strongly negatively related to it.) Together, the

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