



Environmental NGOs, policy entrepreneurs of market-based instruments for ecosystem services? A comparison of Costa Rica, Madagascar and France[☆]



Marie Hrabanski^{a,*}, Cécile Bidaud^b, Jean-François Le Coq^{a,c}, Philippe Méral^b

^a ART-Dev, CIRAD, France

^b IRD, UMR GRED, France

^c CINPE, UNA, France

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 12 April 2012

Received in revised form 2 September 2013

Accepted 2 September 2013

Available online 19 October 2013

Keywords:

Ecosystem services

Payment for environmental services

Norms

Policy transfer

NGOs

States

ABSTRACT

Market based instruments for ecosystem services have become the norm since the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment advanced the concept of “ecosystem services” as an international reference in global governance. In this way, market based instruments for ecosystem services have increasingly been implemented within nation States. In this paper we analyze the role of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in spreading market based instruments for ecosystem services. We put forward the hypothesis that: when a State cannot adequately defend its political and economic sovereignty to produce its own public policies, then the environmental NGOs are strong policy entrepreneurs, that are able to diffuse standards and policy instruments. When a State is more politically and economically capable, the role of environmental NGOs as policy entrepreneurs is more limited. To test this hypothesis, we analyze the diffusion of market based instruments for ecosystem services in three contrasted countries regarding State and NGOs' respective strength: Costa Rica, Madagascar and France. A comparison and analysis of the dissemination of the market based instruments for ecosystem services in different countries therefore seems highly relevant for analyzing such transfers of international standards and policy instruments.

© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Market-based instruments (MBIs) for ecosystem services (ES) consist in a large array of policy instruments designed to modify the behavior of land users or natural resource managers (Pirard, 2012) in ways that maintain or promote ecosystem services (i.e., ‘the benefits that humans derive from ecosystems’ (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005)). One of the more prevalent examples of MBIs for ES is payments for environmental services (PES). PES were originally conceptualized as market transactions (Wunder, 2005), but their definition has expanded as transfers of resources between social actors for the purpose of creating incentives to align land use decisions with social interest in natural resource management (Muradian et al., 2010). Since the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) advanced the concept of ecosystem services as an international reference in global governance (Pesche et al., 2013), MBIs for ES, have become the norm among natural resource management tools. Along with this development, there has been a progressive increase in the implementation of MBIs for ES within nation states (Antona et al., 2012), and we believe that a comparison and analysis of the dissemination of these instruments in different countries provides a highly relevant means to study the transfers of international standards and policy instruments.

We identified three contrasting contexts involving the diffusion of the MBIs for ES: Costa Rica, Madagascar and France.¹ In Costa Rica, the development of a PES program occurred early (1996), and was the result of proactive State policy, and promotion by national actors to achieve national and sectoral (forestry) objectives (Le Coq et al., 2010, 2012; Legrand et al., 2010). Derived from the former forestry incentive system, the PES Program finances the private forest owners of Costa Rica for conservation, reforestation, or sustainable management practices (Pagiola, 2008). But in Madagascar, PES programs (carbon and watershed) have been developed only recently, and primarily by NGOs in an effort to supplant older tools that suffered from unstable funding (Froger and Meral, 2012; Bidaud et al., 2013).² Finally, in France, the development of the

¹ This research was financed thanks to the SERENA program, a project founded by the French Agence Nationale pour la Recherche, reference ANR-08-STRA-13.

² The different PES schemes developed (or under development) in Madagascar are biodiversity, carbon and watershed PES schemes (Froger and Meral, 2012; Bidaud et al., 2013). The biodiversity PES schemes were created through conservation agreements and participatory ecological monitoring. Conservation agreements were initiated by the Conservation International in the Centre-East of the country. The participatory ecological monitoring, launched by the Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust in the West and Centre-East regions, are intended to remunerate local communities that preserve certain target species. The carbon PES have been developed on a large scale in the forests of the East and run by CI, WWF and WCS. The marketing of carbon-credits on the Voluntary Carbon Markets is the main source of funding. The third kind of PES schemes concerns watersheds. Still at an early stage of development, these scheme projects are being run jointly by the WWF and the World Mountain People Association (WMPA). The common point of most of these PES schemes is that they seek the involvement of the national water and electricity distribution company.

[☆] This article belongs to the Special Issue: *Payments for Ecosystem Services and Their Institutional Dimensions: Institutional frameworks and governance structures of PES schemes*.

* Corresponding author at: ART DEV-CIRAD, TA C-88/15, 73 Rue Jean-François Breton, 34398 Montpellier Cedex 5, France. Tel.: +33 4 67 61 57 31; fax: 33 4 67 61 44 15.

E-mail address: marie.hrabanski@cirad.fr (M. Hrabanski).

ES concept arose much later, appearing after the MA report of 2005 (Valette et al., 2012), but offering new opportunities for increasing NGO participation in the public policies of new sectors such as agriculture.

This article undertakes a more thorough analysis of the role of large environmental NGOs in the growth of MBIs for ES in these three countries. The current literature on global environmental politics largely considers NGO influence to be implicit and unproblematic (Betsill and Corell, 2001). For Keck and Sikkink (1998), advocacy coalitions foster the implementation of standards and instruments by putting pressure on actors to adopt new policies. From their point of view, non-State actors, performing as brokers and translators, play a crucial role in the internationalization of standards. However, these approaches pass over the importance of national contexts (social, economic and political). Furthermore, the emergence of new international standards and instruments is not only the result of NGO strategies, but also the result of a balance of power between foreign actors (bilateral or multilateral donors and NGOs) and States.

Responding to several weaknesses in this literature (Betsill and Corell, 2001), we have drawn on the work of policy transfer studies (PTS). It shows that policy entrepreneurs are “public entrepreneurs who, from outside the formal government, introduce, translate and help implement new ideas into public practice” (Roberts and King J., 1991, p.147), and that they can intervene at both national and international levels (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, 2001). Following this vein, we propose to analyze the role of environmental NGOs in spreading MBIs for ES. Are environmental NGOs policy entrepreneurs? The main hypothesis is that 1) environmental NGOs may act as policy entrepreneurs by importing solutions that were developed elsewhere, 2) the ability of environmental NGOs to act as policy entrepreneurs is shaped by the domestic political context, i.e. the State's ability to design and implement its policies. We argue that when a State cannot adequately defend its political and economic sovereignty to produce its own public policies, then the environmental NGOs are strong policy entrepreneurs that are able to diffuse standards and policy instruments. When a State is more politically and economically capable, the role of environmental NGOs as policy entrepreneurs is more limited.

To test these hypotheses, we analyze the diffusion of MBIs for ES regarding State and NGOs' respective strength in three contrasted countries: Costa Rica, Madagascar and France. This article complements existing analyses of the role of environmental NGOs as policy entrepreneurs by focusing on the key part played by the State in environmental policy-making. In the following, the argument regarding the role of NGOs in the diffusion of MBIs for ES unfolds in four steps. The first part deals with the state of the art on policy transfer and NGOs' role. In the next section, we present our methodological framework. In the third part, we propose a historical analysis of the relationship between environmental NGOs and State in each country, and the dynamic of introduction and development of MBIs for ES. In the last part, we compare these dynamics to reach a conclusion about the role of environmental NGOs in policy transfers.

1. Introduction: Policy transfer studies and environmental NGOs

The literature on policy transfer studies (PTS) enables us to analyze the role of environmental NGOs as policy entrepreneurs. PTS developed as an effort to analyze the dynamics of the transfer of public policies from one country to another, or from international to national levels within the context of increasing globalization (Delpeuch, 2009). They place an emphasis on the actors that enable, facilitate or implement the transfer, as well as the reception of the transfer.

PTS show that the non-state actors aiming to impose, promote or facilitate the import–export of specific solutions can be supranational structures such as the European Union (EU), international organizations (international financial institutions, organization of United Nations),

transnational enterprises (banks in particular), consultancy agencies, or NGOs ((Evans, 2004). There are also collective actors less institutionalized, but structured in networks such as epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), advocacy coalitions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) or global public policy networks (Stone, 2008).

The role of NGOs in policy transfer has been addressed more or less directly in different types of studies. Parts of these studies are related to global governance and the role of non-state actors in environmental policies (Betsill and Corell, 2001; Corell and Betsill, 2001; Arts, 2005). Reinalda, who analyzed the importance of NGOs in global governance, proposed the following definition: “NGOs are domestic actors when they confine their activities to their national political systems. They become transnational actors as soon as they operate across national boundaries, for instance by establishing a relationship with a similar NGO in another country. When various NGOs from three or more countries establish an international non-governmental organization (INGO) to serve as a mechanism for co-operation among national NGOs in international affairs, NGOs through their INGO become international actors” (Reinalda, 2001, p12). The definition of Reinalda is particularly relevant because it stresses the national anchorage of the NGO and the process of transnationalization and internationalization that characterizes them. However, Reinalda's studies are not focused on NGOs as agents of transfer at the international level. Other scholars deal with environmental policy transfers, but are not focused on NGOs (Jørgens, 2004; Kern et al., 2001). In our research, the PTS approach has allowed us to examine NGOs as agents of transfer in environmental policies in several countries and to make conclusions about the role of NGOs in environmental global governance. As Dolowitz and Marsh wrote: “NGOs, unlike most categories of actors involved in the policy transfer process, act as agents of both voluntary and coercive transfer. More important, both can be used by other actors to help in their efforts to transfer, or force others to transfer policies. Thus, the activities of these institutions greatly complicate the policy transfer process, particularly if we look at transfer across time, within a political system, or across space, between several political systems” (11) (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

The second main question addressed by the PTS concerns the reception of what has been transferred. The PTS characterize the transfers and classify them from voluntary to imposed. The concept of “lesson drawing” characterizes situations where the decision to take inspiration from a foreign example is made by the importing system outside of all exterior constraints (Rose, 1991). In this case the entrepreneurs search out foreign or external intellectual resources with the idea of importing the best responses to the problems within their jurisdiction. At the other extreme are situations where the transfers are imposed by an external power, for example when a conquered or colonized country is forced to adopt standards similar to those of the imposing government. But in most cases, the importing system benefits from a relative autonomy, and the external elements are transferred within the framework of a voluntary exchange with the exporter.

Furthermore the literature on policy instruments shows that instrumental innovation and policy transfer are more likely to happen during the implementation phase while such innovations might be resisted by veto players during the elaboration phase (Jordan et al., 2003; Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004; Saurruger and Surel, 2006). Therefore we need to analyze the history of the relationship between the transfer entrepreneurs, in our case environmental NGOs, and the importing systems, here represented by the Malagasy, Costa Rican, and French states. A country is particularly susceptible to external influences when it is less able to defend its independence in developing or evaluating its own public policy. Some peripheral countries are completely dependent on external experts for determining whether their existing standards and practices are viable or need reform (Evans, 1999). The variance in the ability of States to defend their independence in developing public policy is represented in the major work of Migdal in which the author distinguishes between strong States and weak States, as a function of these capabilities (Migdal, 1988). Capabilities “include the capacities

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/91555>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/91555>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)