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Defining the Concepts of Organization, Economic Organization and Stabilizer from the Perspective of Complex Systems

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Abstract

This paper is a theoretical investigation that sets forth a scientific debate on the concepts of organization, economic organization, and stabilizer from the perspective of complex systems. By defining these concepts, the paper aims at increasing the intelligibility of social and economic phenomena. In formulating the definitions, we considered the following criteria: the adequacy criterion, the consistency criterion and the independence criterion. The paper is part of a larger study on the economic organization and the paradigm of the living logical system.

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1. Introduction: the significance of scientific concepts

The significance of scientific concepts is essential, as it is one of the cornerstones of the whole edifice of human knowledge. When we refer to knowledge, we have in mind either the mechanism by virtue of which our knowledge is produced, or the result of this approach, framed into concepts or theories [Flonta, 2008, p. 95].

In the evolution of philosophical thinking, we find that there has been an intense focus on the issue of knowledge, approached from the two above-mentioned viewpoints. The concern for the sources of knowledge goes back to the antiquity, when philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Democritus perceived knowledge through the lenses of the intellect, regarding the senses as being changeable and therefore unable to express reality. In their opinion, reality can be penetrated only by means of the intellect, which is capable of discovering the true nature of things.

Alongside the ancient philosophers, rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz were concerned primarily with the first aspect of knowledge, namely the modalities involved in the production of knowledge. According to the rationalist line of argument, it is the intellect, by no means helped by the senses, that is the source of knowledge. In other words, the advocates of the rationalist thesis share the same belief about knowledge, namely that it is rooted in reason, which is dissociated from the senses.

Empiricists like Hume and Locke revolved primarily around the second aspect of knowledge, specifically around the effect of the mechanism by which knowledge is produced and around concepts and theories. Their belief was that any apprehension of reality must be organized into a system of concepts and that sensory information is the source of all awareness of reality. The upholders of the empiricist theory of concepts argue that only concepts derived from sensory impressions have cognitive significance.

Hume found that, by means of the senses, we cannot acquire concepts that we regard as essential, such as the concept of causal connection. Hume's message that "the sensory raw material, the only source of our knowledge, through habit may lead us to faith and expectation but not to the knowledge and still less to the understanding of lawful relations" was quite clear, but also quite crushing [Einstein, 2010, p.86].

Subsequently, Kant set forth a new approach to knowledge, stating that it has two sources: the first source is our ability to receive representations (the receptivity of impressions), while the second source is our ability to become aware of an object by means of these representations (the spontaneity of concepts) [Kant, 2009, p.95]. By means of the former, objects are presented to us, and, by virtue of the latter, they are conceived in relation to those representations. According to Kant, intuition and concepts are undoubtedly the elements of all our knowledge, both being either pure or empirical. They are empirical when they contain sensation (which implies the presence of the object), and pure, when no sensation is involved in the representation (which does not imply the presence of the object). Empirical intuition and concepts are possible a posteriori, while pure intuition and concepts are formed a priori.

In his work *Remarks on Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge*, Einstein [Einstein, 2010, p.83-88] reflects on the evolution of philosophical thinking over the centuries and concludes that a major role was played by the following problem: What kind of knowledge can pure thinking provide irrespective of sensory impressions? Is there such knowledge? And if there is not, where does our knowledge stand in relation to the material provided by the senses?

As far as these questions are concerned, Einstein points out that Kant was right when he maintained that we make use of thinking, of concepts that cannot be reached by virtue of the material provided by the sensory experience, if we consider the situation from a logical point of view. Kant stated that all concepts which arise in our thought and in our linguistic expressions are all – when viewed logically – the free creations of thought which cannot inductively be gained from sense experiences. This is not so easily noticed only because we have the habit of combining certain concepts and conceptual relations (propositions) so definitely with certain sense experiences that we do not become conscious of the gulf – logically unbridgeable – which separates the world of sensory experiences from the world of concepts and propositions.

Einstein argues against the idea that concepts (either common thinking concepts or scientific ones) could be derived from sensations and insists that sensations and concepts are essentially different entities, which cannot be derived from one another. As a matter of fact, Popper's critique of the fact that general concepts and statements can be derived from sensory impressions and from statements about particular facts relied primarily on evolutionary biology, and endorsed, with the increasing detachment characteristic of creative minds, the assumption that there is a

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