Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
10437641 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2016 | 15 Pages |
Abstract
Observers who are angered by rule violations and punish violators often play a critical role in enforcement. Hence a key question is: when will noncompliance provoke anger, and when will it be excused? This paper develops a theory of rule compliance as the outcome of a two-person Bayesian game. The core of the model is its description of what constitutes an excuse. Noncompliance is excused when a “reasonable person” in similar circumstances would also have failed to comply. Phenomena explained include the role of “legitimacy” in enforcement; corruption traps; graduated sanctions for repeat offenders; and tolerance of self-interestedness in markets.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Robert Akerlof,