Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
10437871 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2005 | 33 Pages |
Abstract
A recent literature on the economics of conflict provides conditions under which groups of individuals divide up between “producers” and “predators” - an “anarchic” equilibrium - as well as conditions under which a government agent is empowered to make collective action choices that can completely deter predation. We test these theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment. In the absence of a government agent, groups of subjects choose actions consistent with the anarchic equilibrium. The introduction of a government agent, charged with maximizing the consumption of producers, enables subjects to achieve nearly perfect coordination on the Pareto superior equilibrium where all individuals choose to be producers.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
John Duffy, Minseong Kim,