Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
10468700 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 2005 12 Pages PDF
Abstract
The present paper explores the notion that an important difference between prior operational definitions of “cue” or “heuristic” information versus “message argument” information has to do with differential processing difficulty, and relative ordinal position of these two information types. In previous work, “cue/heuristic” information typically differed from “message argument” information not only in its contents, but also in it being (1) briefer, and (2) presented prior to the message information. We find that it is relative brevity and ordinal position rather than contents that ultimately explain the differences in persuasive impact between “cue/heuristic” versus “message argument” information. In so far as both “cues” and “message arguments” can vary in brevity and order with which they are presented, these findings are consistent with the view that these two information types do not necessarily differ in their persuasive impact.
Related Topics
Life Sciences Neuroscience Behavioral Neuroscience
Authors
, , , , ,