Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
10474486 | Journal of Economic Theory | 2005 | 14 Pages |
Abstract
We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests. In such games, player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff. Players have equal discount factors. With positive probability player 1 is a type who chooses the commitment action after every history. We show that player 1's payoff converges to the maximally feasible payoff when the discount factor converges to one. This contrasts with failures of reputation effects for equal discount factors that have been demonstrated in the literature.
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Authors
Martin W. Cripps, Eddie Dekel, Wolfgang Pesendorfer,