Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
10479978 | Labour Economics | 2005 | 22 Pages |
Abstract
Firing costs may deter firms from engaging in both lay-offs and temporary hiring. While the net response of average employment to firing costs is ambiguous, lay-offs will be reduced through both channels and their frequency therefore will unambiguously decline. This paper estimates the effect of Canadian advance notice and severance laws on individual permanent lay-off hazards. Individual notice laws are found to reduce the lay-off hazard, particularly among non-professional, non-union workers, but the effect is small. Neither group notice nor severance laws are statistically significant. These laws do not appear to substantially affect adjustment in the Canadian labour market.
Keywords
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Jane Friesen,