Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
1052062 | Electoral Studies | 2010 | 6 Pages |
Abstract
Incentives to cultivate a personal reputation encourage legislators to generate policy outcomes for which they can claim credit. We show that these incentives make themselves felt in international agreements – a domain that might typically be considered within the purview of the executive branch. Through a cross-national analysis and brief case studies, we show that countries with electoral systems that encourage personal vote seeking are more likely to negotiate exceptions to treaties meant to liberalize their investment environments. Legislators benefit by being able to claim credit for having protected their constituents from the competition an unrestricted agreement would entail.
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Authors
Brian F. Crisp, Nathan M. Jensen, Guillermo Rosas, Thomas Zeitzoff,