Localism and coordination under three different electoral systems: The national district of the Japanese House of Councillors

Democratic representation involves tradeoffs between collective actors – political parties seeking to maximize seats – and individual actors – candidates seeking to use their personal vote-earning attributes (PVEAs) to maximize their own chance of election and reelection. We analyze these tradeoffs across three different electoral systems used at different times for the large-magnitude nationwide tier of Japan's House of Councillors. These electoral systems – closed and open-list proportional systems and the single non-transferable vote – differ in the extent to which they entail candidates seeking individual preference votes and in whether collective vote shares affect overall party performance. We use local resources as a proxy for PVEA and seek to determine the extent to which parties nominate “locals” and how much the presence of such locals affects party performance at the level of Japan's prefectures.

► Comparison of three electoral systems: SNTV, Closed-List PR, and Open-List PR. ► Variations in vote pooling and preference voting affect party, candidate incentives. ► Many local candidates on open lists; their “personal votes” accrue to the party. ► Minimal local candidates under SNTV, because broader appeal needed to win. ► Few locals on closed lists, most commonly found at marginal ranks.