Toward an epistemology of public participation

This article uses an analysis of the ‘knowledge politics’ of the Botany Community Participation and Review Committee (CPRC) to argue that the Habermasian ideals framing the CPRC are flawed. Habermasian communicative ethics centre upon the notion that fair, free and open forms of debate and communication ensure that no one form of reasoning and/or knowledge dominates others, and so commonly frame attempts to facilitate public participation in technical decision-making. However, in practice, Habermas' advocacy of ‘the power of the better argument’ (1984) supports adversarial debate and favours conventionally validated (i.e. scientific) forms of knowledge over others. This article identifies this departure from the vision underpinning communicative ethics with the routine deployment of a flawed conception of knowledge. This view – that knowledge is representational in character (that is, in effect, a ‘mirror’ onto the world) – marginalises lay contributions by rendering them of secondary status (i.e. that they are ‘values’); diminishes them by insisting that they take conventional ‘expert like’ representational form; and supports ‘deficit model’ approaches (the belief that public antipathy results from knowledge ‘deficits’ resolvable by expert mediated enhancements in technical literacy). A non-representational epistemology is used to argue that effective participation must rather account for how knowledge is constructed by and through processes, including those of participation/deliberation, rather than existing autonomously of them. The implications of this emphasis on processes, rather than on the sources of and formal characteristics of knowledge, are examined both for public participation and for the dynamics of late-modernity more generally.