Decentralized irrigation in China: An institutional analysis

Decentralized irrigation governance can improve irrigation, support water equity and reduce water conflicts. Decentralization, by changing actors’ incentives and encouraging farmers to engage in collective irrigation, can have positive outcomes. However, recent decentralization in developing countries has had mixed results including China. This paper examines empirical evidence from institutional analysis of two decentralized irrigation systems in central China, and finds that even following the same process of decentralization, access rights to water are not always equally distributed within the irrigation community and collective action does not always occur in every decentralized setting. Based on this, I argue that decentralization is not an end in itself. The assumption that local water users would automatically share decision-making rights, as long as these rights are transferred to localities, is wrong. It ignores the various considerations of physical conditions, interests of heterogeneity vs. homogeneity, and potential elite captures, which can influence or determine actors’ incentives and their behaviors.