Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
1160236 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A | 2015 | 5 Pages |
•Bruno Latour's practice-based model of science excludes a role for subjectivity.•To correct this, I put a spin on Latour's diagrammatic representation of his theory.•The practices and subjectivities of science are thus reunited.
Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of “circulating reference.” Unfortunately, Latour's alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour's diagrammatic representation of his theory, I discover a new space for a post-Kantian scientific subject, a subject brilliantly described by Ludwik Fleck. The neglected subjectivities and ceaseless practices of science are thus re-united.