Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
1160341 | Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A | 2012 | 9 Pages |
Abstract
This paper provides a critical evaluation of Friedman’s arguments in favour of a relativized a priori resting on Cassirer’s Neo-Kantianism, Reichenbach’s and Carnap’s constitutive a priori, and finally Kuhn’s account of scientific paradigms change. The main objection concerns Cassirer’s own view of dynamic and historical moveable a priori categories, which Friedman seems to underestimate and recasts in a merely regulative function. However, Cassirer conception of a “liberalized” a priori can shed new light on the process of scientific change and his transcendental method may be considered as a still stimulating alternative to Kuhn’s and post-Kuhnian relativism in the philosophy of science.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
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History
Authors
Massimo Ferrari,