‘Holding’ and ‘endorsing’ claims in the course of scientific activities

•‘Holding’, ‘adopting’ and ‘endorsing’ are distinct cognitive attitudes, pertinent at different stages of scientific practice.•None of these cognitive attitudes is reducible to ‘accepting’ (as defined by Jonathan Cohen).•Aspects of the controversies about GMOs serve to illustrate the differences between ‘holding’ and ‘accepting’.•Implications are drawn for democratic policy-making about science and technology and for the responsibilities of scientists.

My principal aims are to show that holding, adopting and endorsing (definitions of which I provide) are distinct cognitive attitudes that may be taken towards claims at different moments of scientific activities, and that none of them are reducible to acceptance (as defined by Jonathan Cohen); to explore in detail the differences between holding and accepting, using the controversies about GMOs to provide illustrations; and to draw some implications pertinent to democratic decision-making concerning public policies about science and technology, and to the responsibilities that scientists thereby incur.