What is ontic structural realism?

In recent years a doctrine known as ontic structural realism (OSR) has achieved a degree of notoriety, but many people remain confused as to what exactly the doctrine amounts. In this paper three main variants of OSR are defined and discussed: (i) OSR1, which is the view that relations are ontologically primitive but objects and properties are not; (ii) OSR2, which is the view that objects and relations are ontologically primitive but properties are not; (iii) OSR3, which is the view that properties and relations are ontologically primitive but objects are not. Proponents of OSR claim that it is a “naturalistic” metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical views that take objects and/or properties as ontologically primitive are undermined by contemporary physics. In this paper it is argued that OSR1 and OSR2 are themselves undermined by contemporary physics. On the other hand, it is also argued that considerations about the objects of quantum mechanics and general relativity do seem to suggest that we should abandon some of our “common-sense” metaphysical intuitions, and that OSR3 is one of the metaphysical views that is compatible with what these theories seem to tell us about fundamental ontology.