Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
4198750 | Health Policy | 2007 | 14 Pages |
The aim of this study is to map the time-allocation of medical specialists and to examine how it relates to internal organising of work, wage incentives, physicians’ preferences and the demand structure in the population. With regards to internal organising of work and wage incentives, special attention is granted to the private–public divide in specialised healthcare. Survey data from 1183 Norwegian physicians is employed and the empirical models are estimated by means of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, linear logit analysis, binomial logistic regression analysis and multilevel analysis. Physicians working in the private sector and physicians combining private and public work spend relatively more time on patient-assignments than their public counterparts, while public physicians allocate more time to administrative and research/educational tasks. These findings support the proposition that work time allocations mirror the differences in on-call commitments, wage incentives and the division of labour between the sectors. Furthermore, whereas the demand-specific set of variables in the model contributes moderately to the explanation of working time allocation, internal organising of work and physicians’ preferences exert significant effects across the sectors. Future research should focus on physicians’ time allocation since the topic will remain relevant as the European Union's (EU's) Working Time Directive continues to shake the European healthcare systems with traditions for long workdays.