| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4245816 | Radiología | 2009 | 7 Pages |
ResumenObjetivosanalizar si el manejo radiológico de las víctimas graves del 11M estuvo condicionado por su elevado número en 2 hospitales de Madrid. Valorar la organización, detectar fallos y proponer un protocolo de actuación desde los servicios de radiodiagnóstico.Material y métodosal hospital A llegaron 251 pacientes y al B 36. Ambos cuentan con áreas de radiología de urgencias y con protocolos para la atención a politraumatizados. Se comparan: aspectos organizativos (clasificación, identificación), recursos materiales, humanos, asistenciales (número y tipo de exploraciones) así como el manejo radiológico inicial, con el protocolo habitual y con las recomendaciones para incidentes con múltiples victimas.Resultadoslos pacientes fueron clasificados en graves (175) y leves (76) en el hospital A y en muy graves (13), graves (4) y leves (19) en el B. En ambos se reforzó el personal de radiología de urgencias. En el hospital A se practicaron 62 radiografías portátiles, 39 ecografías, 25 tomografías computarizadas (TC) craneales, 6 cervicales, 2 torácicas y 2 abdominopélvicas. En el hospital B se efectuaron 19 radiografías portátiles (74 en total), 9 ecografías y 17 TC cráneo-toraco-abdomino-pélvicas, 2 cervicales, 2 orbitarias y 2 de senos.Conclusiónen ambos hospitales cada víctima se manejó como si hubiera sido única. Las discrepancias entre ambos (porcentaje de TC) se debieron a diferencias en el protocolo habitual para politraumatizados. Reconocidos los errores organizativos se propone un plan de actuación sustentado en la correcta identificación y activación progresiva de recursos materiales y humanos hasta alcanzar los efectivos suficientes.
ObjectivesTo analyze whether the radiological management of seriously injured victims from the March 11 terrorist attempt was affected by the large number of victims treated at two hospitals in Madrid. To evaluate the organization for providing imaging services, detect failings, and propose a protocol for diagnostic imaging departments.Material and methodsTwo hundred and fifty one patients arrived at hospital A and 36 at hospital B. Both centers have emergency imaging areas and protocols for the treatment of patients with multiple trauma. We compared organizational aspects (classification, identification), material resources, human resources, healthcare resources (number and type of examinations), as well as the initial radiological management with the usual protocol and with the recommendations for incidents with multiple victims.ResultsIn hospital A, patients’ injuries were classified as severe (175) or minor (76); in hospital B, injuries were classified as extremely severe (13), severe (4), or minor (19). Additional staff were assigned to the emergency imaging areas in both hospitals. In hospital A, 62 portable plain-film radiographs, 39 ultrasonographic examinations, 25 cranial CT examinations, 6 cervical CT examinations, 2 chest CT examinations, and 2 abdominopelvic CT examinations were performed. In hospital B, 19 portable plain-film radiographs (74 in total), 9 ultrasonographic examinations, 17 cranial-chest-abdominopelvic CT examinations, 2 cervical CT examinations, 2 orbital CT examinations, and 2 CT examinations of the sinuses were performed.ConclusionIn both hospitals, each victim was managed as if he or she were the only patient. The discrepancies between the two hospitals were due to differences in the usual protocol for multiple trauma patients. In light of the organizational errors discovered, we propose a plan of action based on the identification and progressive activation of material and human resources until sufficient levels are achieved.
