Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
4662864 | Journal of Applied Logic | 2014 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
Given a measure I of information added, we can think of I(ac,b)âI(a,b) as a measure of the “deductive gap”, relative to b, between a and aâ§c. When I(a,b)=âlogP(a|b), I(ac,b)âI(a,b)=âlogP(c|ab), the amount of information the indicative conditional 'if a then c' adds to b on Ernest Adams' account of that conditional. When I(a,b)=1âP(a|b), I(ac,b)âI(a,b)=I(aâc,b) where aâc is a material conditional. What, if anything, can be said in general about “information theoretic” conditionals obtained from measures of information-added in this way? We find that, granted a couple of provisos, all satisfy modus ponens and that the conditionals fall victim to Lewis-style triviality results if, and only if, I(aâ§Â¬a,b)=â (as happens with âlogP(.|b)).
Keywords
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Mathematics
Logic
Authors
Peter Milne,