Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
4922188 | International Journal of Project Management | 2017 | 13 Pages |
Abstract
Building information modeling (BIM) plays an important role in furthering value-creation of construction projects by advocating the inter-firm cooperation. When implementing BIM, however, individual firms inherently safeguard their self-interests regardless of the fact that inter-firm cooperation might reap joint BIM benefits for a project overall, which epitomizes a typical problem of moral hazards in project-based organizations. This paper develops an outcome-linked benefit sharing model that considers sharing joint BIM benefits among stakeholders including designers, contractors, and clients for tracking moral hazards therein. By modeling stakeholders' behaviors as evolutionary games within a principal-agent formalism, it has been deducted that (1) designers/contractors could be incentivized to cooperate had each stakeholder received a share higher than the quotient of BIM costs over value-creation in the design/construction phase; and (2) how joint BIM benefits can be more than noncooperation outcomes is key for clients to support BIM implementation.
Keywords
Related Topics
Physical Sciences and Engineering
Engineering
Civil and Structural Engineering
Authors
Linzi Zheng, Weisheng Lu, Ke Chen, Kwong Wing Chau, Yuhan Niu,