Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5034380 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2017 | 9 Pages |
â¢Repeated CRA-issuer interaction is examined in a simple experimental game.â¢CRAs have an incentive to build a reputation for leniency.â¢Issuers and CRAs frequently cooperate at the detriment of naïve clients.â¢Regulation requesting issuers' up-front payment of rating fees is doomed to fail.
We introduce a simple game-theoretical model that captures the main aspects of the repeated interaction between an issuer and a credit-rating agency. It involves up-front payments of issuer fees and direct publication of requested ratings. Due to pecuniary injuries for untruthful ratings, the credit-rating agency should always report truthfully in the subgame perfect equilibrium. Knowing this, the issuer should never request a rating. Conducting laboratory experiments, we find that behavior significantly deviates from the equilibrium prediction in favor of a cooperative solution: issuers frequently do request ratings, which is often reciprocated with untruthful good ratings.