Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5034521 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | 2017 | 33 Pages |
Abstract
We consider a model where two players compete for n items having different common values in a Blotto game. Players must decide how to allocate their common budgets across all n items. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism which yields a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. We analyze behavior under two competing payoff objectives found in the Blotto games literature that have not been previously compared: (i) players aim to maximize their total expected payoff and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority value of all n items. We report results from an experiment where subjects face both payoff objectives and we find support for the differing theoretical predictions.
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Authors
John Duffy, Alexander Matros,