Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
5053902 Economic Modelling 2015 7 Pages PDF
Abstract

•We model auctions where a favored bidder is secretly allowed to submit two bids.•The auctioneer charges a bribe share of the difference between the two bids.•Possibilities of corruption and inefficiency both decrease in the bribe share.•The auctioneer's optimal bribe share increases in the buyer's regulation degree.•The corruption can be ruled out with severe regulation.

Corruption is a prevalent phenomenon in various procurement auctions. This paper explores a pattern of bribery between an auctioneer and a favored bidder, and also investigates the regulation scheme of buyer. In the model, the favored bidder is allowed to submit two bids simultaneously with the advantageous one to be announced; auctioneer decides the share of the difference between two bids which is the bribe transfer. The analysis shows that, the favored bidder does not participate in the corruption if his cost exceeds a threshold; otherwise he submits two bids whose difference is decreasing in the share. The corruption benefits both the auctioneer and the favored bidder but harms other bidders. The bribery endogenously leads to allocation inefficiency with a probability decreasing in the bribe share. Specifically, with two uniformly distributed bidders, we examine how the auctioneer optimizes the bribe share and how the buyer regulates the corruption. We find that, by driving the auctioneer to charge a higher bribe share that is less attractive for the favored bidder, severer regulation tends to reduce the probability of corruption. A buyer who adopts extremely severe regulation can exclude the corruption and achieve maximum social welfare, while a buyer who aims to maximize his own profit should tolerate some degree of the corruption.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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