Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5054024 | Economic Modelling | 2014 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
â¢Optimal patent licensing is considered in spatial models of Salop and Hotelling.â¢For the insider patentee optimal license is always a two-part tariff scheme.â¢Optimal licensing consists of a fixed fee and per-unit royalty.â¢The result is robust to any drastic or non-drastic innovation or cost asymmetries.â¢Provides a justification of the prevalence of two-part tariff licensing in reality.
We show that a two-part tariff licensing contract is always optimal to the insider patentee in spatial models irrespective of the size of the innovation or any pre-innovation cost asymmetries. The result provides a simple justification of the prevalence of two-part tariff licensing contracts in industries.
Related Topics
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Authors
Yuanzhu Lu, Sougata Poddar,