Risk-taking channel, bank lending channel and the “paradox of credibility”

If from one hand credibility is important for the conduct of monetary policy, on the other hand, greater credibility may eventually stimulate the creation of bubbles in the credit market and asset prices through the risk-taking channel, and as a consequence, bring to reality the “paradox of credibility”. The “paradox of credibility” is the new dilemma posed to central banking in the effort to conciliate monetary policy and banking regulation under inflation targeting regimes. Thus, the present work aims to: (i) analyze the impact of central bank actions and the macroeconomic environment on the risk perception of banks, and; (ii) analyze the influence of this risk perception of banks on the credit spread, considering both the credit channel and the risk-taking channel. Based on an econometric analysis, the work provides evidence about: (i) the “paradox of credibility” and the risk-taking channel; (ii) the influence of monetary policies on the risk perception of banks and, as a consequence, on the credit spread; (iii) the procyclical nature of banks in relation to economic activity, and; (iv) the adherence of the countercyclical indicator (called credit gap) proposed in Basel III for the Brazilian case.