Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5054447 | Economic Modelling | 2013 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
It has long been held that central bank independence (CBI) from political control is a necessary requirement to curb inflation. In recent times, however, this long held belief has been challenged. Using a recently compiled panel data set on central bank independence measures, the proposition that greater CBI leads to lower inflation is tested, using latent variable analysis. The use of this alternative econometric technique, along with two additional indicators that capture more appropriately the degree of de facto independence, leads to empirical results that are highly supportive of the negative relationship between CBI and inflation, thereby restoring faith in the conventionally held wisdom, that greater CBI is needed to lower inflation.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Alberto Posso, George B. Tawadros,