Strategic correlativity and network games

We consider the strategic correlativity principle in strategic form games and potential games, which indicate the relationship between an arbitrary pair of players under correlated equilibria. Importantly, the strategies of a pair of players are positively correlated when their expected payoff functions are supermodular, while negatively correlated when their expected payoff functions are submodular. Furthermore, we extend the strategic correlativity principle to strategic form games and potential games in social networks, and investigate the monotonicity of correlated equilibrium in each player's own degree.

► We study strategic correlativity principle (SCP) in normal form and potential games. ► SCP indicates relationship between a pair of players in some correlated equilibrium. ► Strategies are positively correlated iff players' payoff functions are supermodular. ► They are negatively correlated iff payoff functions are submodular. ► We apply SCP in network games to discuss the monotonicity of correlated equilibrium.