Duopoly competitions with capacity constrained input

This paper focuses on the duopoly substitutability product with an upstream input subjected to capacity constraints. The effects of capacity constraints are captured. Combining competition effect with constraint effect, some interesting conclusions are reached. First, the relationship between capacity constraints and firm size is addressed. We argue that the capacity constraints reduce market size difference and price difference under Cournot. Second, under the Stackelberg case, the existence of solution is proved, and Stackelberg competitions enlarge firm-size difference and price difference if the more efficient firm plays the leading position. When the weaker firm plays the leading position, the conclusions depend on the total capacity. Finally, under the Stackelberg case, when the stronger firm plays the leading position, the firm-size difference and price difference decrease with total input under capacity constraints, which is contrary to the conclusions under Cournot competitions.

► This paper focuses on the duopoly substitutability subjected to capacity constraints. ► The effects of capacity constraints are captures. ► Capacity constraints reduce market size difference and price difference for Cournot. ► Conclusions of Stackelberg is contrary to the conclusions under Cournot competitions. ► Under Stackelberg with weaker firm acting as the leader, conclusions are uncertain.