| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5055418 | Economic Modelling | 2011 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350-357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122-1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Shravan Luckraz,