Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5055555 | Economic Modelling | 2008 | 9 Pages |
Abstract
This paper incorporates a durable-good monopoly model and re-examines the argument on licensing contracts. It shows that, from the perspective of the non-producing patent holder, the optimal licensing contract depends on the nature and the degree of the innovations. Specifically, for small cost-reducing or quality-improving innovations, charging a royalty is optimal. For large cost-reducing or quality-improving innovations, licensing by means of a fee and a royalty is superior to using either alone. However, for the case of horizontal product innovations, using a fee contract is optimal.
Keywords
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Changying Li, Xiaoyan Geng,