| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5057573 | Economics Letters | 2017 | 4 Pages |
â¢In the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory, it is assumed that information is symmetric.â¢In their model, ownership matters when investments are partly relationship-specific.â¢We study the case of completely relationship-specific investments.â¢If there is asymmetric information, then ownership matters.â¢Ownership by party B can be optimal, even when only party A invests.
In the Grossman-Hart-Mooreproperty rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed that information is symmetric. Ownership matters for investment incentives, provided that investments are partly relationship-specific. We study the case of completely relationship-specific investments (i.e., the disagreement payoffs do not depend on the investments). It turns out that if there is asymmetric information, then ownership matters for investment incentives and for the expected total surplus. Specifically, giving ownership to party B can be optimal, even when only party A has to make an investment decision and even when the owner's expected disagreement payoff is larger under A-ownership.
