Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5058081 | Economics Letters | 2016 | 5 Pages |
Abstract
â¢We study effort-maximizing disclosure policy of the number of entrants in contests.â¢We adopt a setting of imperfectly discriminatory contests with stochastic entry.â¢We follow a Bayesian persuasion approach.â¢For concave characteristic functions, full disclosure is optimal.â¢For convex characteristic functions, full concealment is optimal.
Following a Bayesian persuasion approach, we establish that full disclosure (resp. concealment) is the contest organizer's effort-maximizing policy for disclosing the number of actual contestants if the characteristic function of the imperfectly discriminatory contest technology is strictly concave (resp. convex).
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Xin Feng, Jingfeng Lu,