Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5058470 | Economics Letters | 2016 | 4 Pages |
â¢We report on a laboratory experiment on school choice.â¢We study the Gale-Shapley (GS) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms.â¢We focus on minority reserves as an affirmative action policy (Hafalir et al. 2013).â¢Minority reserves have positive effects on stability for GS and TTC.â¢Effects on efficiency are disappointing. Only higher rates of truth-telling for GS.
Minority reserves are an affirmative action policy proposed by Hafalir et al. (2013) in the context of school choice. In a laboratory experiment, we find that adding minority reserves to the GS and TTC mechanisms has positive effects on stability but is quite disappointing in terms of efficiency. Also GS induces higher rates of truth-telling by minority students and thus outclasses TTC.