Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5058487 | Economics Letters | 2015 | 5 Pages |
â¢We examine firms' investments in brand equity in a differential game with product differentiation.â¢The feedback equilibrium obtains under open-loop rules.â¢Aggregate expenditure takes an inverted-U shape under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour if differentiation is high.â¢Total industry expenditure is higher under Cournot competition.
We revisit the relationship between market power and firms' investment incentives in a noncooperative differential oligopoly game where firms sell differentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods. The feedback equilibrium obtains under open-loop rules, and aggregate expenditure on goodwill takes an inverted-U shape under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, provided product differentiation is sufficiently high. Total industry expenditure is higher under Cournot competition.