| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5058921 | Economics Letters | 2014 | 4 Pages |
â¢We measure response times in a large-scale public good experiment.â¢The strategy method enables us to classify subjects into cooperator types.â¢Free riders spend much more time before reaching their decision.â¢The result is robust to changing the framing of the game.
We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.
