| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5058990 | Economics Letters | 2014 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
â¢We study the provision of club goods in a frictional environment.â¢Clubs compete in a competing auctions game.â¢The equilibrium is constrained efficient but the reserve price is generally not zero.
We study the assignment of agents to clubs in a frictional market environment. Club entry is endogenous and clubs compete by posting reserve prices in a competing auctions game prior to the agents' decisions regarding which club to visit. The competing auctions equilibrium is constrained efficient and the reserve price in general will not be zero.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Benoit Julien, John Kennes, Moritz Ritter,