Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5059073 | Economics Letters | 2014 | 5 Pages |
â¢We identify the optimal two part tariff licensing for an incumbent innovator.â¢The incumbent and the entrant compete in a differentiated Cournot duopoly.â¢Patent strength, market parameter and substitution coefficient are considered.â¢A pure royalty licensing emerges under a weak patent.â¢The optimal contract always involves a positive royalty in a competitive market.
We investigate a two-part tariff licensing contract that enables an incumbent innovator to license the technology for a new product to a potential rival, who may alternatively develop a compatible technology for an imperfectly substitutable product. We identify the optimal two-part tariff licensing contract based on the development cost incurred by the rival, the market parameter, and the substitution coefficient.