| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5059381 | Economics Letters | 2014 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
This paper studies the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets for the mixed extension of 2Ã2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that games with a strict Nash equilibrium have infinite vNM stable sets, and games without a strict Nash equilibrium have just a unique vNM stable set. A characterization of the strategy profiles that belong to the vNM stable sets is provided. We also show that in games without a strict Nash equilibrium the vNM stable set always contains a Pareto optimal strategy profile.
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Authors
E. Inarra, C. Larrea, A. Saracho,