| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5059889 | Economics Letters | 2012 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
We show that a team may favor self-sabotage to influence the principal's contract decision. Sabotage increases a team member's bonus and total team effort. If these benefits outweigh the reduction in the success probability, sabotaging the team is rational.
⺠We identify a novel explanation for sabotage in teams and self-handicapping. ⺠Self-sabotage increases the team's marginal productivity. ⺠In response, the principal implements higher monetary incentives for the team. ⺠The saboteur benefits from a larger individual bonus payment. ⺠Moreover, the saboteur benefits from higher efforts by his/her teammates.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Matthias Kräkel, Daniel Müller,