Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5060011 | Economics Letters | 2013 | 4 Pages |
A bank that needs a public bail-out to avoid liquidation can use financial contracts to provide contingent liquidation rights to investors and force the government to increase public support. Limiting the size of the bail-out before knowing the bank's financial condition decreases welfare if the government is strongly pro-continuation.
⺠This article analyzes the financing policy of a bank in need of public bail-out. ⺠Debt and equity issues allocate control rights over liquidation of the bank. ⺠Debt issues commit the government to supporting the bank and facilitating financing. ⺠Debt generally increases the bail-out size above the bank's financial needs. ⺠Commitment to limited bail-out on the part of a pro-continuation government can reduce welfare.