| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5060290 | Economics Letters | 2012 | 5 Pages |
Abstract
We study credible information transmission by a benevolent short-lived central bank. When externalities create a wedge between private and social welfare, the central bank has an incentive to misreport its information. Information transmission through monetary policy creates a distortion, thus, lending credibility.
⺠We study credible information transmission by a benevolent short-lived central bank. ⺠Externalities create a wedge between private and social welfare. ⺠As a result, the central bank has an incentive to misreport its information. ⺠Information transmission through monetary policy creates a distortion, thus, lending credibility.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Marie Hoerova, Cyril Monnet, Ted Temzelides,