| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5060305 | Economics Letters | 2011 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
We show the identification of important features of the model in a perfect information entry game with two players and asymmetric payoffs when there are no unbounded regressors and the distribution of the unobservables is not parametrically specified.
⺠Semiparametric identification is shown of parameters of firms' profits in a 2Ã2, perfect information, asymmetric entry game. ⺠No identification at infinity argument is used for the results. ⺠A way of testing the asymmetry assumption is suggested. ⺠Identification of coefficients of both continuous and discrete regressors is discussed.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
NeÅe Yıldız,
